With recent suicide bombings in Paris and Brussels, Islamic extremism continues to be a significant concern in world affairs.
In Syria and Iraq, an international military coalition is attempting to combat the most
recent example of Islamic extremism- the Islamic State of the Levant and Syria
(ISIL). A seemingly unique and isolated case, ISIL is rather a symptom of the
environment that creates and enables Islamic extremism. This analysis will
examine three interrelated factors that have created and continued Islamic
extremism in the region: 1) the suppression of democracy by authoritarian governments ; 2) divisions between religious and ethnic groups in Iraq and Syria; and 3) foreign intervention from Gulf and Western forces.
Suppression of
Democracy by the Government
The suppression of democracy by the government was pivotal in the success of Islamic extremism. In both Bashar al-Assad’s
Syria and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, political and civil participation were completely
regulated by the government. According
to an analysis by the U.S State Department in 2002, “freedom of expression, association and movement [did] not exist in Iraq.” A
similar comparison was issued in 2011 by a group of Syrian activists when they
proclaimed that “citizenship[is] reduced to a narrow concept of belonging to one party and to personal loyalty”.
Opposition forces that spoke out against the regime were brutally
suppressed in both Iraq and Syria. Under Assad’s rule, “torture and ill
treatment [to silence] dissidents were systemic and systematic”. In 1991, Kurdish and Shia oppositional uprisings were crushed by
Hussein’s security forces.
Embattled and suppressed, the people turned to religion as an
answer to the regime’s crimes. As Robin
Yassin-Kassab states, “the return to religion came in the age of the security states, and was in large part a consequence of them”. As their crimes increased and both regimes
began to lose power, religion became an accepted force that filled the void
left by the state. Beginning as a genuine medium of unification, this religious
revival, however, proved to further suppress democracy and participation as it
was hijacked by religious extremists. By suppressing civic participation,
both Assad’s Syria and Hussein’s Iraq created a fertile ground for a
fundamentalist revival in the region.
Divisions of Religious and Ethnic Groups
Differences between religious sects and ethnicity exist in both Syria and Iraq. Each state has mishandled and often exacerbated these differences for its own gain. This intensification of sectarian differences has created an opportunity for Islamic extremists to exploit the concerns of marginalized communities and receive sympathy for its movement.
In Syria, Bashaar Al-Assad employed a divide-and-conquer strategy to attempt to control the country. During the civil war, the regime deliberately “targeted Sunni areas for collective punishment and sectarian provocation.” Conversely, Alawis and some Shia were pragmatically protected to encourage loyalty to the regime. These tactics provoked a dual response from the Syrian people: on the one hand, they divided ethnic communities to benefit the regime and they also facilitated sympathy from the marginalized communities for the extremists groups.
ISIL “arrived in Syria as they’d oncearrived in Iraq, gently at first, exploiting the people’s torments at the hands of a well-armed occupier- in Iraq the Americans, in Syria the delegitimizedregime.” In order to win over embattled Syrians, ISIL representatives “brought with them large amounts of food and medicine” and lots of money. In Syria especially, embattled opposition forces were forced to welcome extremists for pragmatic reasons. Due to their war against the Assad regime, opposition forces needed the logistical support and resources that the extremists were able to provide for them.
Disenfranchised Sunnis in both countries thus became the prime target for Islamic extremists. In Iraq, the Sunnis were suppressed by Prime Minister Maliki’s Shia-dominated cabinet. The government isolated Sunnis from participation and as a result, allowed “Sunni insurgents [to assert]Sunni claims to power.” In Syria, too, the entry of Shia militias "gave the conflict a Sunni-Shia flavor [that] fitted it into a regional struggle which had not flared since the American occupation of Iraq”.
In facilitating sectarian differences for their own gain, both regimes thus helped facilitate an environment that enabled extremists to flourish in both countries. The extremists were also able to capitalize on the grievances of affected communities by portraying themselves as defenders of the marginalized classes.
Foreign
Intervention
Regional and international intervention also advanced the rise
of Islamic extremism in Syria and Iraq. The entry of Gulf and Western military
forces, as well as financial support, has empowered extremists in the region.
In attempting to curtail the regional power of Shia-governed
Iran, Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia has supported Sunni extremists in the Middle
East. Although the Saudi government does not offer official aid to any
extremist organizations, the Washington Institute acknowledges that “Saudi citizens continue to represent a significant funding source for Sunni groups operating in Syria”. As Toby Matthiesen clarifies, “Saudi recruits for al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group are often motivated by a desire to contain Shiism and stem Iranian influence in the region”.
In Iraq, the U.S invasion and
occupation helped insert a majority Shia cabinet into power. This new
government increasingly isolated Sunnis from decision-making. As a tribal
leader from Iraq noted, “the Shia-dominated Iraqi government isolated Sunni tribes,designated us enemies and stripped us of all benefits….as a result, many tribesmen joined Daesh [ISIL] to get revenge from the state.” Isolated Sunnis in both Iraq and Syria thus became a primary target in the
recruitment and power base of ISIL and other extremist groups.
Although Iraqi sectarian escalations
and the Syrian civil war began internally, they have quickly escalated into a
proxy war of regional and international players attempting to influence the
region according to their respective interests. In attempting to impose favorable
strategic and political conditions, however, foreign actors are also furthering
the conditions that have enabled the rise of Islamic extremism in both
countries.
Conclusion
There is an urgent need to address the problem of
Islamic extremism. But, in order to treat a problem one must first understand
it. A military coalition may be enough to eliminate ISIL but it will not
eliminate the conditions that have enabled the rise of Islamic extremism. In
order to solve this problem, solutions must focus on targeting the foundational
causes: dictatorial governments, sectarian division, and opportunistic foreign intervention.
A more holistic effort that includes civil reconstruction and popular
participation needs to be widely supported. If not, various forms of extremism
will continue to flourish in both countries and continue to affect the world.